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Abstract—The capacity to link records associated with the same individual across data sets is a key challenge for data-driven 
research. The challenge is exacerbated by the potential inclusion of both genomic and clinical data in data sets that may span 
multiple legal jurisdictions, and by the need to enable re-identification in limited circumstances. Privacy-Preserving Record 
Linkage (PPRL) methods address these challenges. In 2016, the Interdisciplinary Committee of the International Rare Diseases 
Research Consortium (IRDiRC) launched a task team to explore approaches to PPRL. The task team is a collaboration with the 
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) Regulatory and Ethics and Data Security Work Streams, and aims to 
prepare policy and technology standards to enable highly reliable linking of records associated with the same individual without 
disclosing their identity except under conditions in which the use of the data has led to information of importance to the 
individual’s safety or health, and applicable law allows or requires the return of results. The PPRL Task Force has examined the 
ethico-legal requirements, constraints, and implications of PPRL, and has applied this knowledge to the exploration of 
technology methods and approaches to PPRL. This paper reports and justifies the findings and recommendations thus far. 
Index Terms—data matching, privacy, privacy-preserving record linkage, record linkage  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
RIVACY-PRESERVING Record Linkage (PPRL) [1] 
addresses two primary challenges that lie at the inter-
section of biomedical research and clinical practice: 
1. The de-duplication and linking of datasets for 
use by researchers, without disclosing the partic-
ipant’s identity; and 
2. The re-identification of research participants for 
clinical purposes, such as to return results that 
may be useful in clinical diagnosis or treatment.  
 
In 2016, the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health 
(GA4GH) (genomicsandhealth.org) launched a task team 
to explore ethical questions, regulatory requirements, and 
technological methods and approaches related to PPRL. 
The task team is a collaboration in which the GA4GH 
(Regulatory and Ethics Work Stream and the Data Securi-
ty Work Stream) is preparing policy and technology 
standards, together with the Interdisciplinary Committee 
of the International Rare Diseases Research Consortium 
(IRDiRC) to enable highly reliable linking of coded data 
records associated with the same individual without dis-
closing the identity of that individual except under condi-
tions in which the use of the data has led to information 
of importance to the individual’s safety or health, and 
applicable law allows or requires the return of results.  
The primary motivation of the GA4GH in this en-
deavour is its conviction that because linkage enables the 
creation, availability, and precision of data, it therefore 
improves the quality of both research and the health care 
provided to people. The GA4GH believes that this rein-
forces the right to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits as guaranteed by Article 27 of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, as mobilized in the GA4GH 
Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and Health-
Related Data [2]. 
2 ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1 Sensitivity Considerations or Centralization 
The ability to conveniently link data can itself dramatical-
ly increase the risk of breach, because it carries with it a 
corresponding boost in various adversaries’ motivation to 
access the more valuable data sets. State and non-state 
actors alike will hardly be able to pass up the chance to 
access comprehensive, centralized (or centralizable) glob-
al repositories. Any PPRL system’s designers should first 
carefully analyze the risks, benefits, and available safe-
guards based on a variety of threats. 
Legal frameworks recognize risk as inherent to link-
age. Personal data held for research purposes in the Ca-
nadian province of British Columbia, for example, can be 
linked only if “any data linkage is not harmful to the in-
dividuals who are the subjects, … and benefits … are 
clearly in the public interest” [3], [4], [5]. Article 35 of the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) has the effect of requiring that a data protec-
tion impact assessment be carried out prior to putting in 
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place an international PPRL system" [7]. 
Data aggregation through linkage runs the risk of in-
advertently transforming into identifiable data, data that 
were not previously perceived as reasonably foreseeably 
identifiable. Linkage methods should thus either include 
metrics for measuring the level of protection or offer al-
ternative safeguards. 
2.2 Generating Linkage Data 
The simplest method of linking data about an individual 
is to assign to the individual a unique identifier that is 
derived from a relatively immutable set of the individu-
al’s personal data and that would irrefutably be associat-
ed with the individual and her data wherever they may 
go. Although several countries have moved toward the 
approach, it has often been accompanied by controversy, 
and this approach is neither legally nor politically feasible 
in global health-related data sharing. The most direct im-
pediment is that a number of laws require or recommend 
that identifiers not be generated on the basis of personal 
information [6], [7]. 
A more privacy-conscious approach to linkage is to as-
sociate the immutable personal data with a randomly 
generated pseudonym that will serve as the unique iden-
tifier associated with all the individual’s records. In this 
way, linking the pseudonym with anything about the 
person will be impossible without first having access to 
the relevant immutable data. 
But this approach suffers from its own legal and prac-
tical shortcomings. Since the goal of the exercise is to link 
as many data sets as possible, and since data collection is 
rapidly increasing, a correspondingly larger number of 
people would necessarily have access to the immutable 
data in question, thus creating a major vulnerability in the 
privacy-protection scheme. The law in many jurisdictions 
reflects the reality of this danger. For example, since 1999, 
the US Congress has in its appropriations bills consistent-
ly prohibited the use of federal funds to create a standard, 
unique health identifier.  
In the European Union, although the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation, like the Data Protection Directive before 
it, empowers member states to adopt frameworks for an 
“identifier of general application,” few have done so. The 
provision in the Regulation adds a new condition that de-
spite any national framework, such identifiers “shall be 
used only under appropriate safeguards for the rights 
and freedoms of the data subject pursuant to this Regula-
tion.” The existing interpretive guidance additionally 
suggests avoiding the use of the same pseudonym across 
different datasets [7]. 
PPRL will have to turn to methods other than those 
that suffer from the shortcomings described above. 
2.3 Participant Withdrawal 
The design of an effective PPRL system should also in-
clude robust support for participant withdrawal. This 
right arises strongly in research ethics, medical ethics, and 
data protection. The GDPR explicitly requires that it must 
“be as easy to withdraw as to give the consent” [7]. The 
right to informed consent, whether in research ethics, 
medical liability, or data protection, always includes an 
inalienable right to revoke consent at any moment, lim-
ited only by the impossibility of changing the past. 
Withdrawal poses special challenges with respect to 
the use of immutable data as identifiers, hash values de-
rived from immutable data, and Bloom filters [1] that use 
immutable identifiers to link data. The right to withdraw 
also poses pernicious difficulties in distributed, complex 
systems where distinct entities link, aggregate, or share 
existing data sets without a uniformly enforced govern-
ance policy that specifically enables participant with-
drawal. 
Although retroactive withdrawal is generally not pos-
sible, prospective withdrawal is essential. Systems should 
be designed to allow participants or patients to withdraw 
their consent to the processing of their personal data 
without the risk of their previously linked data “re-
emerging” when their data are re-entered into the system 
in some future time. This can be a challenge for hash-
based systems in some configurations, particularly when 
the underlying metadata are simply removed from the 
index and not removed from the system. These difficul-
ties are not technically insurmountable, but a PPRL sys-
tem should include a means of ensuring that the partici-
pant is able to withdraw her consent at any time. 
 
2.4 Returning Results to Participants 
Secondary use of large, health-related data sets, particu-
larly those that include genomic data, presents the possi-
bility of inadvertent discovery of a previously unknown 
health-risk factor that affects the participant. These health 
risks may be more or less serious, or more or less pre-
ventable. 
While participant re-identification for return-of-results 
may be prohibited, or the participant’s “right not to 
know” may need to be enforced, in other ethico-legal con-
texts, the ability to return results to participants in situa-
tions where a serious, preventable condition is discovered 
may be mandatory. Therein lies the challenge. 
A PPRL system thus should be designed to accommo-
date both possibilities – prohibited re-identification and a 
required re-identification capability. The most obvious 
approach would be to design a distributed PPRL system 
such that the re-identification entity is optional so that, for 
example, in jurisdictions where re-identification is prohib-
ited, this capability can be omitted. Whatever the ap-
proach taken, care must be taken to appropriately account 
for the potential that a participant has his data held sim-
ultaneously by multiple entities, some of which allow re-
identification while others prohibit it, to help ensure that 
the overall system can most optimally comply with the 
diverging requirements. 
3 TECHNICAL METHODS AND APPROACHES 
3.1 Desired Features and Attributes  
The joint GA4GH–IRDiRC effort aims to identify and rec-
ommend for further consideration one or more approach-
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es to enable linkage of coded1 data across organizations 
such that even though records have been linked, no in-
formation about the identity of the individual to whom 
the data pertain can be ascertained unless the relevant 
research project has chosen to allow its participants’ iden-
tities to be disclosed in the limited circumstances where 
disclosure corresponds to the individual’s wishes or 
where required by law. Consistent with the ethico-legal 
considerations discussed above, the following desired 
features and attributes were identified:    
  
 The approach should recognize, with a high de-
gree of confidence, coded records associated with 
the same individual. 
 The approach should be applicable to any data 
type (e.g., text, clinical data, images, genomic da-
ta). 
 The approach should use a linkage algorithm 
that does not require the knowledge of the indi-
vidual’s direct identifiers. 
 The approach should not inherently fail to rec-
ognize records associated with the same individ-
ual due to spelling differences, typographical er-
rors, missing and out-of-date data, and other mi-
nor irregularities. 
 The approach should enable a participant to limit 
linkages to her data.  
 The approach should use techniques that are re-
sistant to re-identification attacks (e.g., frequen-
cy, dictionary, cryptanalysis), while enabling re-
identification when required and authorized. 
 The approach should enable an assessment of 
linkage quality and completeness. 
 The approach should be scalable and distributa-
ble, allowing linkage of very large datasets across 
multiple organizations. 
 The approach should have been implemented for 
use, and not simply theoretical. 
3.2 Current State of Knowledge and Practice 
Within research environments like those in which 
GA4GH and IRDiRC generally work, PPRL is most often 
used for the purpose of creating a research dataset in 
which all records pertaining to the same person are linka-
ble, even as the identity of the person remains unknown 
to the researchers. Accomplishing this presents two dif-
ferent kinds of challenges in an international ecosystem 
that highly values privacy. The first relates to legal re-
 
1 This article uses the term “coded” to describe records or 
other data whose personal identifiers have been removed 
and replaced with a re-identification code that is generat-
ed independently of the values of identity attributes. Cod-
ing requires not only the removal of direct identifiers, but 
also indirect (or quasi-) identifiers, thereby making it im-
possible to derive the participant’s identity without access 
to the information associating the code with an individu-
al. Coding, according to this definition, is a form of pseu-
donymisation.   
strictions that sometimes regulate the collection, use, and 
disclosure of specific attributes including a person’s 
name, gender, birthdate, and place of birth, such as in 
HIPAA. The second is that the more records a data set 
contains pertaining to the same individual, the easier it 
will be to identify that individual – a problem called sta-
tistical disclosure control. This tendency simultaneously 
empowers Big Data analytics. 
Experts studying identifiability distinguish between di-
rect identifiers such as a person’s personal unique identifi-
er (PUID) and, in most contexts, their name, on the one 
hand, and quasi‐identifiers (QIDs), such as gender, date of 
birth, and address, on the other. If a one-to-one mapping 
of individual-to-code is likely possible, the code is con-
sidered a direct identifier. QIDs also, however, play an 
important role in PPRL. 
To be most useful, the records to be linked need to in-
clude a common set (or subset) of attributes, and the at-
tributes need to be expressed such that they are recog-
nizable across data sets (e.g., spelling consistency, com-
mon metadata, controlled vocabulary). PPRL involving 
Big Data, such as genomic data, presents additional chal-
lenges, including scalability, linkage quality, and in-
creased privacy risk [8]. In some contexts, these challeng-
es can be addressed by pre-processing techniques, such as 
those described by Christen [9]. 
Record linkage is generally accomplished using one of 
three basic types of protocols [9]: 
1. Two-party protocols are used when only two da-
tabase owners want to link their data. 
2. Three-party protocols are used when two parties 
are assisted by a trusted third party, enabling the 
linkage to occur without either party seeing the 
other’s data. 
3. Multi-party protocols are used to link more than 
two data sets, and may involve a trusted third 
party. 
3.3 PPRL Techniques 
PPRL techniques have evolved over time. First-generation 
techniques (mid-1990s) were primarily based on exact 
matching using simple hash encoding. The U.S. National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) Global Unique Identifiers 
(GUID) approach is an example of this technique [10]. 
These techniques are challenged by the fact that a single-
letter difference in the attribute values used will yield 
dramatically different hash values. 
Second-generation techniques (early 2000s) rely upon 
approximate matching and include comparisons of edit 
distances and other string-comparison functions. The 
principal limitation of these techniques is scalability. 
Third-generation techniques (mid-2000s) take scalability 
into account and often represent a compromise between 
privacy-protection and scalability; these techniques may 
allow for some information leakage [9]. 
A large number of matching approaches and protocols 
have involved some combination or extensions of the fol-
lowing techniques [9]: 
 Secure hash encoding. This is done using a cryp-
tographic hash function (i.e., a one-way algo-
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rithm that, given any size string of characters as 
input, will produce a unique, repeatable, fixed-
size output). Hash functions play a major role in 
PPRL because of their ability to reliably confirm 
matching inputs without directly revealing any 
information about the content of those inputs. 
However, dictionary and frequency attacks are 
possible and are generally mitigated by injecting 
a random value known as a “salt” into the out-
put. Also, hash functions test only exact matches 
and have no inherent capacity to handle near 
matches. 
 Statistical linkage key (SLK). An SLK is a de-
rived variable generated from components of di-
rect and indirect identity elements. The SLK-581 
[11], developed by the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare to link health datasets, is an 
example of a statistical linkage key. The format of 
the complete SLK-581 is XXXZZDDMMYYYYM -
- where XXX is the individual’s family name, ZZ 
is the given name, date of birth is represented as 
DDMMYYYY, and gender is represented as M, F, 
or U. SLK-based masking has been shown to 
provide limited privacy protection and poor sen-
sitivity [9]. Also, because an SLK comprises iden-
tity elements, it would not meet the GA4GH re-
quirements that the approach “not require 
knowledge of the individual’s identity” and “use 
techniques that are resistant to re-identification 
attacks.” 
 Encryption schemes. These approaches involve 
the use of encryption algorithms to link data. For 
example, secure multi-party computation (SMC) 
is a cryptographic method in which multiple par-
ties jointly compute a function while keeping 
their individual inputs private. During the com-
putation, each participating party computes part 
of the function, and in the end, each party knows 
only the end result and its own input. 
 Bloom filter. In this approach, hash values are 
loaded into a vector, which is then compared 
with other vectors similarly generated, resulting 
in either a “definite no” or a “perhaps yes” 
match. The method was first defined by Schnell, 
whose paper provides a detailed description of 
how Bloom filters work [1]. Bloom-filter encod-
ing has been widely used as an efficient tech-
nique for matching records without sacrificing 
privacy [1], [9], [10]. 
3.4 Challenges 
Several challenges to accurate and efficient record-linkage 
have been identified. Van Grootheest et al. [12] studied 
record-linkage performance under simulated conditions 
and found that linkage performance is dependent upon 
the algorithm used, the choice of linkage variables, the 
dataset size and overlap, and errors in datasets. Although 
personally identifiable information (PII), such as date of 
birth and name at birth, often is considered immutable, 
mistakes and discrepancies in recording the information, 
language and spelling differences, and variations in for-
mat render it mutable nonetheless. Some have turned to 
biometric data (e.g., fingerprint, DNA) as more immuta-
ble for the purpose of linkage. However, this approach 
can pose its own challenges, including significant privacy 
risk, collection cost, and inconvenience. 
Some approaches are technically interesting, but may 
be computationally impractical. In particular, approaches 
involving asymmetric encryption of large quantities of 
data are computationally intensive. Hardware-based en-
cryption, which implements encryption algorithms in 
hardware rather than software, dramatically improves the 
efficiency of encryption solutions; however, software-
based solutions are more cost-effective and therefore 
more widely used. For several decades, homomorphic 
encryption has held promise for data linking, but has 
been prohibitively time consuming. Recent advances hold 
promise for the practical use of homomorphic encryption 
for data linkage purposes [13]. 
PPRL approaches are susceptible to several adversarial 
models and attack methods, such as dictionary attacks, 
frequency attacks, cryptanalysis attacks, and collusion [9]. 
As with any system, assessing the security and resilience 
of any PPRL system may require multiple approaches, 
depending upon the mechanisms used, the architecture of 
the system, and the intended use.  
Another PPRL challenge is the need to design the sys-
tem such that linkages can be destroyed or modified once 
they are established. Such a mechanism might be desira-
ble, for example, to enable new pseudonyms to be reas-
signed to individuals who were affected by a security 
breach, to delete a synonym when a participant revokes 
consent to use her data, or to re-identify and re-contact an 
individual to provide him with important health-relevant 
results. This challenge is sometimes addressed by using a 
hash value as an internal (protected) intermediate value 
that is associated with an independent, randomly gener-
ated identifier that is distributed and used as a pseudo-
nym, with the ability to be reassigned at will. This ap-
proach enables a pseudonym to be revoked or changed 
without affecting every individual in the data set, so long 
as the hash value itself remains secure. 
3.5 Current Approaches 
U.S. National Institutes of Health Global Unique Iden-
tifier. The US National Institutes of Health (NIH) devel-
oped the Global Unique Identifier (GUID) Tool as a cus-
tomised, client–server software application used to a 
Global Unique Identifier (GUID) for each study partici-
pant. The GUID is a subject pseudonym designed to al-
low a researcher to share data specific to a study partici-
pant without exposing personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII), and to match participants across labs and 
research data sets. 
To generate a GUID, the data holder enters a number 
of PII data elements, including gender, name, and birth 
location, which are used to generate a hash value that the 
data holder sends to the GUID server. If the hash value 
matches an existing entry in the GUID index, the associ-
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ated GUID pseudonym is returned to the data holder. If 
the hash value does not match an existing entry, a new 
GUID is randomly generated and returned. 
No PII ever leaves the data holder. Because the GUID 
is randomly generated, no attacker could infer the identi-
ty of the individual based on the GUID alone. The same 
individual’s information will produce the same GUID 
across time, location, and research context, allowing re-
searchers to match shared data regardless of its source 
without sharing or viewing PII [10]. However, an attacker 
with knowledge of the data elements used to generate the 
hash value, and with access to a GUID client, could gen-
erate the hash value and then query the server to retrieve 
the GUID associated with that individual, thus allowing 
the attacker to re-identify the participant in any pseudon-
ymised data set to which he can obtain access. 
Mainzelliste (Germany). Mainzelliste is an open-
source, RESTful service for pseudonymisation developed 
at the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz. A user in-
puts PII (e.g., name, date of birth) and receives back a 
pseudonym generated using data unrelated to the identi-
fiable elements. The pseudonymisation service maintains 
a database of identifiable data strings matched to pseu-
donyms. Upon receiving the identifiable elements, the 
service performs a lookup to determine whether a pseu-
donym already exists. The lookup runs a linkage algo-
rithm to account for near matches (e.g., typographical 
errors). If a match is found, the service returns the exist-
ing pseudonym. If no match is found, the service gener-
ates and returns a new pseudonym [16], [17]. 
Linkage is possible even in the event of typos or alter-
nate spellings. Mainzelliste allows for the possibility of 
using in-house phonetic codes and string comparisons for 
linkage, thereby allowing names from other linguistic 
backgrounds to be fault-tolerantly compared. Currently, 
weight-based record linkage is supported, but the modu-
lar concept allows for retrofitting an in-house algorithm. 
The possibility to manually rework uncertain assignments 
further supports the automatic matching process [9]. 
European Patient Identity Management. The Europe-
an patient-identity management solution (EUPID) ap-
proach addresses the risk associated with the GUID sys-
tem, as described above, by using context-specific data 
elements and hashing algorithms to generate a context-
specific pseudonym for each individual. The context-
specific pseudonyms then are linked within the EUPID 
system and associated with a linkage pseudonym, with-
out revealing the context-specific pseudonyms included 
in the association. 
The EUPID approach, originally developed by the Eu-
ropean Network for Cancer Research in Children and 
Adolescents (ENCCA), was designed to meet the follow-
ing requirements: 
 Prevent duplicate registration of patients. 
 Preserve the capability to re-identify subjects by 
a trusted third party in special cases.  
 Support the capability to use different pseudo-
nyms for the same patient in different contexts, 
while preserving the capability for a trusted third 
party to link datasets pertaining to the same pa-
tient and stored under different pseudonyms — 
while assuring that patient identification in any 
single context is nearly impossible from another 
context. 
 Avoid creating a transparent universal patient 
ID. 
 Assure that the approach can be implemented in 
a distributed computing environment. 
 
The EUPID scheme is illustrated in Figure 1, from Nitz-
lnader and Schreier [15], which provides detail regarding 
the methodology and how the EUPID linkage is generat-
ed and used in actual practice. A key feature is context-
specific pseudonymisation, which maintains identity 
linkages locally, while enabling re-identification of a 
linked data set through a three-party collaboration in-
volving the local context, the linkage agent, and a trusted 
third party. EUPID combines several of the PPRL match-
ing techniques discussed in Section 3.3 to identify linkag-
es, and an optional trusted third party to enable re-
identification as authorized. 
4 DISCUSSION 
PPRL techniques and approaches generally use either a 
direct identifier (PUID) or a quasi-identifier (QID). The 
use of this information is regulated throughout the world 
under applicable jurisdictional laws and institutional pol-
icies. The mere centralization of data presents privacy 
challenges. In addition, considerations such as the need to 
enable participants to withdraw from a research study 
and the various policies relating to the return of results 
must be factored into the design of a PPRL approach and 
implementation. 
Any PPRL approach must consider privacy risks in-
herent in its methods. A hash value generated using 
PUID or QID cannot be used as a pseudonym because the 
 
Fig. 1. The ENCCA Unified Patient Identifier (EUPID) approach ena-
bles the use of context-specific pseudonyms (PIDs), while preserving 
the capability for a trusted third party to link PIDs pertaining to the 
same individual, through the use of indexed EUPIDs [15].  
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/TCBB.2018.2855125, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Computational Biology and Bioinformatics
6 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY AND BIOINFORMATICS, TCBBSI-2018-06-0272 
 
hash value is derived from personal data, which often is 
prohibited by applicable law or regulation. Also, use of a 
hash value as a pseudonym that does not allow re-
identification may be illegal in some contexts due to the 
right of participants to withdraw, to access their own da-
ta, and to receive the results of research performed using 
their data returned when so desired. 
Some of the technical approaches examined generate a 
random or quasi-random pseudonym, and store an asso-
ciation between the generated pseudonym and a hash 
value derived from PII. In this way, no participant can be 
identified on the basis of the pseudonym alone. However, 
a unique linkage between a PII-based hash value and a 
pseudonym leaves open the possibility of using the link-
age system to reverse-discover the pseudonym associated 
with a known individual. 
The Bloom filter approach may be less vulnerable to 
this type of reverse-discovery attack if a large number of 
hash functions and a sufficiently long filter are used [9]. 
The Bloom filter approach produces quantitative values 
reflecting the strength of the match, and has been shown 
to produce linkages comparable to those produced by 
traditional methods using unencrypted identity attributes 
[12]. 
The hope behind these initiatives is to simultaneously 
safeguard privacy while also furthering open data ideals 
such as the FAIR principles (not to be confused with FIPP, 
the Fair Information Practice Principles, discussed below), 
which demand that data be Findable, Accessible, Interop-
erable, and Reusable [18]. Since their emergence in the 
scientific context, FAIR principles have been recognized 
as particularly important where health-related data are 
concerned. 
It is important to recognize that the very act of linking 
records pertaining to the same individual may make them 
easier to identify. Indeed, this is why many research pro-
grams require a minimum “bin size” or “cell size” -- i.e., 
that a minimum number of individuals be represented in 
any bar in a histogram (“bin”) or any single “cell” in a 
spreadsheet. Linking two records within a “bin” essen-
tially reduces the bin size, and increases privacy risk. In 
addition, a trusted third-party (used in all 3 of the imple-
mentations discussed above) becomes an attractive target 
for attackers. 
A strong data-linkage approach should conform to the 
“principle of least privilege” wherein each entity has ac-
cess to only those data and system privileges it needs to 
perform its assigned functions. EUPID takes a step in the 
right direction through its context-based pseudonymisa-
tion and collaborative approach to re-identification. But 
all three of the approaches discussed in Section 3.5 in-
clude a single point of failure. Methods that distribute 
trust across entities, such as multi-party computation 
(MPC) and federation, are potential avenues for address-
ing this vulnerability.  
As in other areas of data-sharing, no technical solu-
tions on their own can ensure both data privacy and data 
sharing. Any workable international PPRL solution will 
require strong privacy policy, enforceable through the 
combined use of technical methods, like those discussed 
above, and robust organizational and governance 
measures, perhaps taking inspiration from the Fair In-
formation Practice Principles (FIPPs) that undergird most 
international privacy law.
5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
After considering the methods and approaches discussed 
above, the PPRL Task Force concluded that the EUPID 
approach held the most promise for the emerging, global 
GA4GH and IRDiRC research environment. In particular, 
the Task Force was impressed with EUPID’s use of con-
text-specific identity attributes, hashing functions, and 
pseudonyms to localize privacy risk, and its use of pho-
netic hashing to enable robust linking. The model in prin-
ciple can be federated and scaled to accommodate other 
consortia and data-sharing efforts. In addition, the mod-
el’s “re-identification” capability could be offered as an 
optional module for contexts that require the capability to 
learn the identity of a research participant under special 
circumstances, and with appropriate authorisation. 
The PPRL Task Force is collaborating with the EUPID 
project to deepen its understanding of the EUPID model 
and to further explore its use. A security review is 
planned as well as an investigation of the feasibility of 
using secure multi-party computation (SMC) as part of 
the federation model. 
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